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Abstract 
The article challenges the assertion that the apartheid system in South Africa was a crime 
against humanity under customary international law giving rise to individual responsibility 
prior to the drafting of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The article 
also examines the role of the Rome Statute in the criminalization of apartheid and assesses 
the current status of the crime of apartheid in customary international law with particular 
reference to the principle of legality (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege). Nothing in the 
article should be read as condoning the gross violations of human rights that resulted from 
the policies of apartheid in South Africa in any way. 
 
I. Introduction 
Few political institutions in history have received as much universal condemnation as 
the apartheid policies of South Africa. The harrowing testimonies heard by the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) show that this condemnation 
was well founded. Unfortunately the attempts to criminalize apartheid by the 
international community before the drafting of the 1998 Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court
1
 (hereinafter Rome Statute) lacked the specificity that 
penal legality requires and, additionally, the failure of significant numbers of states to 
ratify the relevant Conventions (before the drafting of the Rome Statute) prevented 
the creation of a customary norm. This article examines the role of the Rome Statute 
in the criminalization of apartheid and assesses the current status of the crime in 
customary international law with particular reference to the principle of legality 
(nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege). 
 This article challenges the dominant narrative
2
 that the apartheid system in 
South Africa was a crime against humanity under customary international law giving 
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rise to individual criminal responsibility.
3
 However nothing in this article should be 
read as condoning the gross violations of human rights that resulted from the policies 
of apartheid in South Africa. The contemporary significance of the topic should not be 
underestimated either because, notwithstanding the formal end of apartheid in South 
Africa in 1994, the term continues to be applied in a number of contexts (particularly 
in relation to Israel and Palestine)
4
 and consequently remains important in 
understanding the legal basis of a continuing rhetorical discourse. 
The unique element in the criminalization of apartheid at the international 
level was that it sought to impose individual criminal responsibility on conduct that 
was explicitly lawful in the territory in which it occurred. It is hoped that a forensic 
examination of the process of criminalization of a particularly egregious form of 
systematic racial discrimination may prove useful should the international community 
be minded to criminalize similar conduct (such as systematic discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation) in the future. 
Given the widespread human suffering that resulted from the policies of 
apartheid in South Africa, the wish to label these policies as a crime against humanity 
as part of a process of stigmatization (and delegitimization) is entirely understandable. 
The desire to apply this toxic label to similar examples of widespread human 
suffering is equally understandable. However, with regard to the crime of apartheid, 
there has been a marked tendency to 'short-circuit' the voluntarist approach to the 
creation of customary international criminal law and a willingness to present 'oughts' 
(de lege ferenda) as 'ises' (lex lata).
5
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The advantages of insisting on a traditionalist methodology in the context of 
ascertaining the status of the crime of apartheid in customary international law are 
twofold. First, it preserves a foundational premise of international criminal law: the 
principle of legality (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege)
6
 and, secondly, it 
acknowledges that the normative force of transformative initiatives will always need 
to be rooted in the social reality of state practice. In this context, the incorporation of 
new international crimes into the domestic criminal law of states is essential to ensure 
both normative alignment and source legitimacy for these transformative initiatives. 
 Part II of this article examines the international legal instruments that sought 
to criminalize apartheid prior to the drafting of the Rome Statute, notably the 1968 
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity
7
 (the 1968 Convention) and the 1973 International 
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid
8
 (the 
Apartheid Convention), as well as Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
9
 
and the International Law Commission’s 1996 Draft Code of Offences Against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind (1996 Draft Code). Part II will also consider the 
finding that apartheid was a crime against humanity in the Final Report of the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission with particular reference to the 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Concluding that Apartheid is a Crime Against 
Humanity submitted by a group of 21 international jurists.
10
 Part III addresses the 
process by which the crime of apartheid was included in the Rome Statute. Part IV 
considers the principle of legality in the context of the international crime of apartheid 
and Part V concludes by assessing the current status of the crime of apartheid (as a 
crime against humanity) under customary international law. 
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II. The Crime of Apartheid prior to the Rome Statute 
A. Introduction 
Although the term apartheid is usually used to describe the South African policy of 
racial classification and segregation between 1948 and 1994 (the apartheid era), the 
practice of racial discrimination in South Africa pre-dates the coming to power of the 
Nationalist Party in 1948. The first United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
resolution expressing concern regarding racial discrimination in South Africa was 
passed in December 1946.
11
 What distinguishes the apartheid era is the systematic 
manner in which the Nationalist Party formalized their policies of racial 
discrimination through legislation and the brutality of the enforcement mechanisms 
established to implement them. 
 In the early UNGA debates over the question of apartheid in South Africa, the 
controversy over the scope and application of the principle of domestic jurisdiction
12
 
was particularly evident.
13
 Only after the Sharpeville Massacre on 21 March 1960 did 
the UNGA finally condemn South Africa for being in wilful breach of its obligations 
under Article 56 of the UN Charter.
14
 From 1966 the UNGA began to condemn the 
policies of apartheid as practised in South Africa as a crime against humanity.
15
 These 
UNGA resolutions attracted few negative votes (usually only Portugal and South 
Africa) but a significant number of abstentions. The first reference to apartheid as a 
crime against humanity occurred in 1965 in a UNGA resolution relating to South 
West Africa.
16
 A slightly earlier UNGA resolution in 1965 also condemned the 
policies of racial segregation practised in Southern Rhodesia as a crime against 
humanity, although this resolution attracted a significantly higher number of negative 
votes (nine) than similar UNGA resolutions condemning South Africa’s apartheid 
policies at the time.
17
 
                                                 
11
 ‘Treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa’, UNGA Res. 44(I), 8 December 1946. 
12
 Art. 2(7) UN Charter. 
13
 See R. Higgins, The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United 
Nations (Oxford University Press, 1963), at 120-123. 
14
 UNGA Res. 1598 (XV), 13 April 1961. 
15
 See UNGA Res. 2202A (XXI), 16 December 1966 and UNGA Res. 2671F (XXV), 8 December 
1970. 
16
 ‘Question of South West Africa’, UNGA Res. 2074 (XX), 17 December 1965. 
17
 ‘Question of Southern Rhodesia’, UNGA Res. 2022 (XX), 5 November 1965. 
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 The first condemnation of apartheid in an internationally binding legal 
instrument can be found in the 1966 International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).
18
 Article 3 of ICERD requires state 
parties to ‘condemn racial segregation and apartheid and undertake to prevent, 
prohibit and eradicate all practices of this nature in territories under their jurisdiction’. 
Contrary to some assertions,
19
 Article 3 of ICERD does not oblige states party to the 
Convention to recognize apartheid as a crime against humanity nor does it attempt to 
assert extra-territorial jurisdiction. The first attempt to criminalize apartheid in a 
legally binding international instrument was made two years later, during the drafting 
of the 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War 
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity (the 1968 Convention). 
 
B. The 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to 
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity 
On 26 November 1968, the UNGA adopted a draft convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity 
(the 1968 Convention).
20
 Article 1(b) of this Convention provides (inter alia) that no 
statutory limitation will apply to ‘inhuman acts resulting from the policy of apartheid 
… even if such acts do not constitute a violation of the domestic laws of the country 
in which they were committed’.21 The UNGA resolution adopting the draft 1968 
Convention was approved by 58 votes in favour, seven against and 36 abstentions. As 
Miller notes, ‘[m]ore opposing votes were cast against the adoption of this convention 
than voted in opposition to any prior international human rights instrument.’22 
The main criticism made by states during the drafting of the 1968 Convention 
was that the statement in Article I that statutory limitation would not apply to the 
listed crimes ‘irrespective of the date of their commission’ failed to respect the 
principle of legality (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege). The wording of the 
                                                 
18
 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted 7 
March 1966, entered in force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195 (ICERD). 
19
 See R. Kok, Statutory Limitations in International Criminal Law (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007), at 98 
(quoting the argument of The Netherlands during the drafting of the 1968 Convention). 
20
 UNGA Res. 2391 (XXIII), 26 November 1968. 
21
 The Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity (adopted 26 November 1968, entered in force 11 November 1970) 754 UNTS 73. 
22
 R. Miller, ‘The Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity’, 65 American Journal of International Law (AJIL) (1971) 476-501, at 477. 
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definition of crimes against humanity was also regarded as problematic by a number 
of states. The problems associated with the wording of the 1968 Convention has 
meant that it has had a somewhat limited effect and (to date) it has only been ratified 
by 54 counties. 
The 1968 Convention is an important milestone on the road to recognizing that 
crimes against humanity can be committed outside the context of an international 
armed conflict, but it cannot — by itself — be regarded as recognizing the existence 
of apartheid as an international crime against humanity for two reasons. First, the 
voting record demonstrates a clear lack of consensus on the issue and, secondly, it is 
doubtful that a convention whose sole purpose is to require states not to apply a rule 
of statutory limitation to a disputed categorization of crimes against humanity can 
ipso facto create a crime against humanity i.e. a convention providing for purely 
procedural matters cannot be used as a bootstrapping device to create a substantive 
offence. 
Further, although the preamble to the 1968 Convention recalls that both the 
policies of apartheid and the violation of the economic and political rights of 
indigenous populations are crimes against humanity, Article I(b) only refers to 
‘inhuman acts resulting from the policies of apartheid’. It can be argued that the 1968 
Convention only recognizes the ‘inhuman acts’ carried out to enforce apartheid as 
crimes against humanity to which no statutory limitation shall apply rather than the 
policies of apartheid per se. There are no references to the economic and political 
rights of indigenous populations in the operative parts of the 1968 Convention. 
 The Memorandum of Law in Support of Concluding that Apartheid is a Crime 
Against Humanity (Memorandum of Law) submitted to the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) acknowledges that the 1968 Convention was not 
universally accepted but asserts that ‘forty of the forty-three countries that abstained 
or voted against the Statutory Limitations Convention did so on technical grounds 
having nothing to do with whether apartheid was a crime against humanity.’23 It is 
disturbing to see the principle of legality (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) 
described as a technicality and the voting record on this issue (which was combined 
with the reference to violations of the economic and political rights of an indigenous 
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population) was 59 to six with 25 abstentions.
24
 The Memorandum of Law also fails to 
address the implications of the sparse ratification of the 1968 Convention in asserting 
its customary effect. 
 
C. The Apartheid Convention 
Article I(1) of the Apartheid Convention provides that 
 
The States Parties to the present Convention declare that apartheid is a crime 
against humanity and that inhuman acts resulting from the policies and 
practices of apartheid and similar policies and practices of racial segregation 
and discrimination, as defined in article II of the Convention, are crimes 
violating the principles of international law. 
 
One question that has divided the commentators is the scope of application of 
the Apartheid Convention. Article II of the Apartheid Convention states that, 'For the 
purposes of the present Convention, the term "the crime of apartheid", which shall 
include similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination as 
practised in southern Africa, shall apply to the following inhuman acts ...'.
25
 
 The wording of Article II makes it clear that the Convention also applies to 
similar policies of racial discrimination as practised in South West Africa (now 
Namibia) and (Southern) Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and the wording of Article II is 
even wide enough to encompass Portuguese colonial policies in Mozambique and 
Angola. 
The majority of the commentators regard the Apartheid Convention as ‘limited 
in time and space’26 but Dugard supports the argument that the Apartheid Convention 
was intended to apply more widely by reference to its endorsement in a wider context 
                                                 
24
 See UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1573, 15 October 1968, at 1-2. 
25
 The Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish texts of the Apartheid Convention are equally 
authentic (Art. XIX) and the equivalent French text reads as follows: 'Aux fins de la présente 
Convention, l'expression "crime d’ apartheid", qui englobe les politiques et pratiques semblables de 
ségrégation et de discrimination raciales, telles qu’elles sont pratiquées en Afrique australe, désigne 
les actes inhumains indiqués ci-après ...'. 
26
 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (2nd edn., Oxford University Press, 2008), at 13. See also 
M.C. Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (Transnational Publishers, 2003), at 145 
and L. Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives (Oxford 
University Press, 2003), at 59. For the views of the ILC in this regard see infra the text accompanying 
note 50. 
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in instruments adopted both before and after the fall of apartheid notably Additional 
Protocol I and the Rome Statute.
27
 Dugard also notes that a number of states have 
ratified or acceded to the Apartheid Convention since the end of apartheid in South 
Africa.
28
 With respect, neither the fact that subsequent international conventions 
abandon the apparent geographical restrictions contained in Article II of the Apartheid 
Convention (and, in the case of Additional Protocol I, this conclusion is doubtful) nor 
the fact that states continue to ratify the Apartheid Convention supports the contention 
that the Apartheid Convention itself was intended to apply to situations other than 
southern Africa. The first argument is a non sequitor and the second argument is 
based on an unsupported assumption about the reality of a causal connection that, 
even if it existed, could not rewrite the Apartheid Convention. 
 Clark submits that the Apartheid Convention was not intended to be limited to 
practices occurring in southern Africa on the grounds that Article II ‘is drafted so as 
to “include” the cases of southern Africa, but not exclusive to them'.29 An 
examination of the travaux préparatoires of the Apartheid Convention does not 
support this interpretation. The initial draft of Article II did not contain the phrase ‘as 
practised in southern Africa’. During the drafting process, the representatives of 
Australia,
30
 Cyprus
31
 and the United States
32
 raised the possible wider application of 
the Apartheid Convention as an example of an unintended consequence due to the 
vagueness of the drafting. The Moroccan representative agreed that Article II should 
be made clearer and she proposed that the phrase ‘as practised in southern Africa’ 
                                                 
27
 J. Dugard, ‘L’Apartheid’, in H. Ascensio, E. Decaux and A. Pellet (eds), Droit International Pénal 
(2nd edn., Pedone, 2012) 197-207, at 200. 
28
 Ibid. Azerbaijan (1996), Georgia (2005), Guatemala (2005), Honduras (2005), Montenegro (2006), 
Paraguay (2005), Republic of Moldova (2005), Serbia (2001) and Uruguay (2012). 
29
 R. Clark, ‘Apartheid’, in M.C. Bassiouni (ed), International Criminal Law: Volume 1 – Sources, 
Subjects and Contents (3rd edn., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008) 599-620, at 603. See also M.C. 
Bassiouni and D. Derby, ‘Final Report on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court for the 
Implementation of the Apartheid Convention and Other Relevant International Instruments’, 9 Hofstra 
Law Review (1980-1981) 523-592, at 530; I. Bantekas International Criminal Law (4th edn., Hart, 
2010), at 236; and M. du Plessis, ‘International criminal law: The crime of apartheid revisited’, 24 
South African Journal of Criminal Justice (2011) 417-428, at 423. 
30
 See UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.2004, 23 October 1973, at 143 [§ 4]. 
31
 See UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.2003, 22 October 1973, at 142-143 [§ 39]. 
32
 See UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.2003, 22 October 1973, at 142 [§ 36]. 
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should be added to draft Article II.
33
 The proposed Moroccan amendment was 
adopted by 89 votes to three with 19 abstentions.
34
 
 Article II of the Apartheid Convention also states that the enumerated 
inhuman acts constituting the material elements of the crime of apartheid must be 
committed ‘for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial 
group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing 
them’. It does not appear that the precise ambit of the mens rea of the crime of 
apartheid was ever addressed during the drafting of the Apartheid Convention.
35
 Clark 
denies that Article II requires evidence of specific intent on the grounds that ‘the 
principle of strict construction is arguably not a generally accepted mode of treaty 
analysis’36 but Dugard challenges this view on grounds that strict interpretation in 
favour of the accused is a general principle of criminal law.
37
 
Another controversial aspect of the Apartheid Convention is the question of 
universal jurisdiction. Article V states that a competent tribunal of any state party to 
the Apartheid Convention may try persons charged with ‘the crime of apartheid’ as 
defined in Article II if they have acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 
This approach certainly implies that jurisdiction is based on universality but it is 
unclear on what basis this jurisdiction could have been applied to either South Africa, 
(Southern) Rhodesia or Portugal as non-parties to the Apartheid Convention. Article 
V of the Apartheid Convention also envisages the creation of an international penal 
tribunal having jurisdiction over the acts enumerated in Article II. Reydams suggests 
that the incorporation of universal jurisdiction in the Apartheid Convention can be 
explained by reference to two factors. First, in 1973 there was even less prospect of 
establishing an international criminal court than there had been in 1948 and, secondly, 
the fact that the Apartheid Convention was drafted with the three white minority 
regimes in southern Africa in mind meant that state parties had little to fear from 
reciprocity.
38
 
                                                 
33
 See UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.2005, 24 October 1973, at 150 [§ 12]. For the text of the Moroccan 
amendment see UN Doc. A/C.3/L.2020, 24 October 1973 (original French). 
34
 See UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.2008, 26 October 1973, at 162. 
35
 See Clark, supra note 29, at 604. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Dugard, supra note 27, at 203. This principle is reflected in Art. 22(2) ICCSt., regarded by some as a 
codification of existing customary law. See Cassese’s International Criminal Law, revised by A. 
Cassese, P. Gaeta et al. (3rd edn., Oxford University Press, 2013), at 33. 
38
 Reydams, supra note 26, at 59. 
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The Apartheid Convention was adopted by the UNGA on 30 November 
1973.
39
 Although there are currently 108 parties to the Apartheid Convention, the 
customary status of the convention has been challenged on the grounds that ‘[i]n view 
of the refusal of most Western states to ratify the convention, its provisions should be 
considered to be legally binding only on the states parties.’40 It is tempting to dismiss 
the reference to ‘Western states’ as Euro-centric but, as Tomuschat notes, ‘[t]he fact 
that the West has consistently rejected the Apartheid Convention proves that a 
universal opinio iuris is missing.’41 As Bassiouni acknowledges, there are two 
essential and endemic problems with the Apartheid Convention. First, it appears 
intended to apply to southern Africa only, and, secondly, its definition of what 
constitutes the prohibited practices in Article II ‘is too broad and imprecise with 
regard to the requirements of penal legality and specificity.’42 
 
D. Additional Protocol I 
The diplomatic pressure to isolate South Africa and criminalize apartheid further was 
evident during the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts held in four sessions 
between 1974 and 1977 not least because 11 national liberation movements (including 
all the major national liberation movements engaged in armed conflicts in southern 
Africa) participated as observers. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 
was adopted on 8 June 1977 and entered into force on 7 December 1978. There are 
currently 173 parties to Additional Protocol I.
43
 
                                                 
39
 UNGA Res. 3068 (XXVIII), 30 November 1973. The voting record (non-recorded) was 91-4-26. The 
four states that voted against the resolution were Portugal, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. Dugard, supra note 27, at 198. 
40
 H. Hannum, ‘Human Rights’ in C. Joyner (ed.), The United Nations and International Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 1997), at 144. See also C. Tomuschat, ‘Crimes Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind and the Recalcitrant Third State’, 24 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (1995) 41-
62, at 54; E. Zoller, ‘La definition des crimes contre l’humanitié’, 120 Journal du droit international 
(1993) 549-568, at 558 and Cassese, supra note 26, at 13. 
41
 Tomuschat, supra note 40, at 55. 
42
 M. Bassoiuni, International Crimes: Digest/Index of International Instruments 1815-1985, Vol. 1 
(Oceana Publications Inc., 1986), at 405. See also G. Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The 
Struggle for Global Justice (2nd edn., Penguin Books, 2002), at 252-3 and A. Zahar, ‘Apartheid as an 
International Crime’, in, A. Cassese et al. (eds), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal 
Justice (Oxford University Press, 2008) 245-246, at 246. 
43
 As of 30 May 2013. See the ICRC International Humanitarian Law database, available online at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl (visited 30 June 2013). 
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Article 85(4)(c) of Additional Protocol I states that the 'practices of apartheid 
and other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity, 
based on racial discrimination’ are grave breaches of Protocol I when committed 
wilfully and in violation of Protocol I. The commentary notes that sub-paragraph (4) 
is concerned with ‘off the battlefield’ grave breaches and that, outside the scope of 
application of Additional Protocol I, the crime of apartheid remains exclusively within 
the domain of crimes against humanity.
44
  
 As noted above,
45
 Dugard argues that the criminalization of the ‘practices of 
apartheid’ in Additional Protocol I lacks the geographical limitations contained in 
Article II of the Apartheid Convention but the travaux préparatoires do not support 
this assertion. Given the context (and timing)
46
 of the drafting of Additional Protocol 
I, the inclusion of the 'practices of apartheid’ in the list of grave breaches was 
inevitable although it was missing from the list of grave breaches in the draft Protocol 
I initially prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The list 
of grave breaches (that ultimately became Article 85 of Additional Protocol I) was 
adopted by consensus but several delegations questioned the feasibility of some of the 
provisions due to the vagueness of the drafting. The inclusion of the 'practices of 
apartheid’ was singled out for criticism in this regard.47 
 There is no definition of the 'practices of apartheid’ in Additional Protocol I 
itself and the travaux préparatoires reveal that the supporters of the addition of the 
'practices of apartheid’ to the list of grave breaches justified its inclusion primarily by 
reference to the Apartheid Convention (some references were also made to the 1968 
Convention). It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the ambit of the material 
element of the 'practices of apartheid’ cannot be wider than the crime of apartheid in 
the Apartheid Convention and that the requirement that the 'practices of apartheid’ 
                                                 
44
 Y. Sandoz et al. (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 (ICRC-Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), at 1002. 
45
 See text accompanying note 27 above. See also J. Dugard, International Law: A South African 
Perspective (4
th
 edn., Juta & Co, 2011), at 159 (‘That apartheid knows no geographical limitation is 
confirmed by the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949’). 
46
 The school student-led Soweto Uprising began on 16 June 1976. Over 170 people were killed and, 
on 19 June 1976, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution (by consensus) strongly condemning 
the South African government for its resort to violence against school children and affirming ‘that the 
policy of apartheid is a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind’. SC Res. 392 (1976). 
47
 Summary Record of the 64
th
 Meeting, 7 June 1976, CDDH/I/SR.60, Official Records of the 
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-1977), Volume IX (Bern: Federal Political Department, 
1978), at 307 [§ 9] (Austria), at 310 [§ 28] (Australia), at 310 [§ 29] (France), at 316 [§ 64] (Finland). 
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must be committed wilfully and in violation of the Conventions or Additional 
Protocol I is, arguably, considerably narrower than some interpretations of the mens 
rea elements of the crime of apartheid in the Apartheid Convention. 
 
E. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
In 1983 the International Law Commission (ILC) returned to the question of the Draft 
Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (originally prepared by 
the ILC in 1954) at its 35
th
 session in Geneva. In its analytical paper, the ILC made 
reference to the views of a large number of representatives (20 states) that the future 
Code should be broadened to take account of developments since 1954 and that 
special emphasis should be placed in the proposed Code on the crime of apartheid.
48
 
In 1991 the ILC adopted, on first reading, a draft code of Crimes against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind that included the crime of apartheid (draft article 
20).
49
 The commentary notes that the definition of the crime of apartheid contained in 
draft article 20 was based, both in letter and in spirit, on article II of the 1973 
Apartheid Convention but that the ILC did not want to limit the scope of the 
definition in the draft article by references to southern Africa, as was the case in 
article II of the 1973 Apartheid Convention.
50
 
There is no explicit reference to apartheid in the final text of the 1996 Draft 
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1996 Draft Code) 
adopted by the ILC at its 48
th
 session.
51
 However draft Article 18(f) includes 
‘institutionalized discrimination on racial, ethnic or religious grounds’ amongst the 
systematic or large scale acts that constitute crimes against humanity and the ILC 
commentary notes that this ‘is in fact the crime of apartheid under a more general 
denomination'.
52
 
The Memorandum of Law makes reference to the 1996 Draft Code in support 
of its finding that apartheid was a crime against humanity under customary 
                                                 
48
 Draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind - Analytical paper prepared 
pursuant to the request contained in paragraph 256 of the report of the Commission on the work of its 
thirty-fourth session, UN Doc A/CN.4/365, 25 March 1983, at 29-30 [§ 91]. 
49
 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, reprinted in [1991] Yearbook of 
the ILC Volume II (2) 79-107. 
50
 Ibid., at 103 [§ 4]. 
51
 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1996), reprinted in [1996] 
Yearbook of the ILC Volume II (2) 15-56. 
52
 Ibid., at 49 [§ 12]. 
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international law
53
 but ignores the controversy that surrounded the ILC’s work in this 
regard. 
 
Suffice it to say that this five-decade effort was controversial from the 
start, although it was not put out of its misery until 1996 when the 
Commission “concluded” its work with a “Code”.54 
 
F. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Crime of 
Apartheid 
In 1995 the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was 
established to establish the nature, causes and extent of the gross violations of human 
rights committed from 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date (10 May 1994) and to grant 
amnesty to persons who made full disclosure of all criminal offences (or delicts) 
falling within a number of prescribed categories and committed with a political 
objective during that period provided that the formal requirements of the amnesty 
process had been complied with.
55
 
 In its Final Report, the TRC affirmed that, in its judgment, apartheid, as a 
system of systematic racial discrimination, was a crime against humanity under 
international law.
56
 The TRC also stated that in making its findings ‘the Commission 
was guided by international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions'.
57
 The 
Appendix (in Volume 1) containing the TRC’s finding that apartheid was a crime 
against humanity acknowledges The Memorandum of Law in Support of Concluding 
that Apartheid is a Crime Against Humanity (Memorandum of Law) submitted by a 
group of 21 international jurists as well as the comments of Professor John Dugard.
58
 
The problem with the TRC’s conclusion that apartheid was a crime against 
humanity is that South Africa did not vote in favour of any of the international 
                                                 
53
 See Slye, supra note 10, at 278. 
54
 R. Clark, ‘History of Efforts to Codify Crimes Against Humanity: From the Charter of Nuremberg to 
the Statute of Rome’, in L. Sadat (ed.), Forging a Convention for Crimes Against Humanity 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011) 8-27, at 15. 
55
 The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 34 of 1995, reproduced in J. Grant and 
C. Barker, International Criminal Law Deskbook (Cavendish Publishing, 2006) 381-403. 
56
 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, 1998) Volume 1, at 94 [§ 1] (hereinafter TRC Report) and Volume 5, at 222. 
57
 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, 2003) Volume 6, at 593 [§ 18]. 
58
 TRC Report Volume 1, supra note 56, at 94 fn. 29. 
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resolutions labelling apartheid as a crime against humanity (and the legal effect of 
these UNGA and Security Council resolutions is questionable in any event) nor was it 
a party to any of the international conventions that categorized apartheid as a crime 
against humanity prior to 1995. This crucial issue is not dealt with in the TRC’s Final 
Report but is addressed by both Professor Dugard and the 21 international jurists who 
drafted the Memorandum of Law. 
The Memorandum of Law asserts that systematic racial discrimination 
(including apartheid) is a violation of a jus cogens norm of international law, that jus 
cogens norms bind all states and, that no state may ‘opt out’ of (or persistently object 
to) a jus cogens norm.
59
 There are two difficulties with these assertions. The first 
difficulty is that the proposition that needs to be proven (i.e. ‘that the prohibition on 
apartheid is a peremptory norm, a norm of jus cogens, to which the normal rules 
relating to persistent objection are inapplicable’60) is explicitly assumed in the 
premise. This is a type of logical fallacy known as begging the question or petito 
principii (assuming the initial point). The second difficulty is that even if systematic 
racial discrimination is a violation of jus cogens, this fact does not of itself create an 
international crime involving individual criminal responsibility.
61
 
With regard to the first difficulty, as Ragazzi notes, ‘one would be inclined to 
accept without question the proposition that no persistent objection to [the 
international prohibition of apartheid] is admissible; yet articulating the reasons for 
this conclusion is not easy.’62 One possible rationale for the problem is that, according 
to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a peremptory norm is 
‘a norm accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a whole’ 
(emphasis added) and, thus, the presence of a non-consenting state would operate to 
prevent the emergence of a peremptory norm.
63
 With regard to the second difficulty, 
if the international prohibition of apartheid was a ius cogens norm of international law 
                                                 
59
 Supra note 10, at 289. See also E. Bankes, The State Immunity Controversy in International Law: 
Private Suits Against Sovereign States in International Law (Springer, 2005), at 167. 
60
 Dugard, supra note 45, at 29. 
61
 See the ILC’s Commentary on 1996 Draft Article 19, at § 17 (noting that a breach of a rule of jus 
cogens does not necessarily and automatically constitute an international crime). 
62
 M. Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes (Clarendon Press, 1997), at 71. 
See also R. Bernhardt, ‘Custom and Treaty in the Law of the Sea’, 205 Hague Recueil (1987-V) 247-
330, at 269. 
63
 See M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005), at 324. But see also Merits, Domingues v United States, Case 
12,285, Report 62/02, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 22 October 2002 at §§ 84-85. 
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that ipso facto created an international crime involving individual criminal 
responsibility, the granting of amnesties could be characterized as ‘opting out’ of the 
obligation to repress grave breaches of international humanitarian law.
64
 
In Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) v. The President of South Africa,
65
 
AZAPO and the relatives of a number of the victims sought to argue that the proposed 
amnesties were in breach both of the right to redress contained in the South African 
Interim Constitution as well as the equivalent provisions of the Geneva Conventions 
(I-IV) to which South Africa was a party. The South African Constitutional Court 
accepted that section 35(1) of the Interim Constitution required them to ‘have regard 
to public international law’ but held that it was doubtful that the Geneva Conventions 
(or the Additional Protocols) applied to the conflict under discussion.
66
 The Court also 
stated that even if Additional Protocol II was applicable to the conflict, article 6(5) of 
that Protocol encouraged the granting of the ‘broadest possible amnesty to persons 
who have participated in the armed conflict’.67 
 
G. Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the TRC’s findings regarding the status of the crime of apartheid, no 
one sought or was granted amnesty for the practices of apartheid itself but for the 
gross violations of human rights (that also constituted crimes under South African 
law) carried out in order to enforce apartheid. The absence of an explicit reference to 
‘the crime of apartheid’ in the ILC’s 1996 Draft Code is indicative of a widespread 
belief that the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 had consigned both the 
concept and the attempts to criminalize it to history. 
                                                 
64
 See, for example, Case of Almonacid-Arellano et al v. Chile, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Judgment of 26 September 2006 (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), Series C, 
No. 154, at §§ 105-114 (‘crimes against humanity are crimes which cannot be susceptible of amnesty’). 
65
 [1996] ZACC 16; 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC). See also J. Dugard, ‘Is the Truth and Reconciliation 
Process Compatible with International Law? An Unanswered Question’, 13 South African Journal on 
Human Rights (1997) 258-268. 
66
 At § 29 fn.29 (‘Even if the conflict in South Africa could be said to fall within ... [Additional 
Protocol I], ... [t]his Protocol was never signed or ratified by South Africa during the conflict’.). 
67
 At § 30. But see also J. Dugard, ‘International Law and the South African Constitution’, 1 EJIL 
(1997) 77-92, at 89-91 (‘As apartheid has been labelled as a crime against humanity ..., it is surprising 
that no attempt was made to address the question whether customary international law requires the 
prosecution of those who commit this crime’). 
 16 
 
III. The Inclusion of the Crime of Apartheid in the Rome Statute 
A. Introduction 
The crime of apartheid was not included in the statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (or of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR)) despite a request for it to be included from the ICRC.
68
 The 
crime of apartheid was also missing from the list of crimes against humanity in the 
Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court produced by the Preparatory 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court although the core 
concept undoubtedly falls within the concept of persecution on ‘political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural or religious’ grounds that was included in subparagraph (h) 
of proposed article Y (defining crimes against humanity).
69
 By contrast, apartheid was 
initially included in the possible options for the proposed definition of war crimes as 
an example of an outrage upon personal dignity.
70
 
The idea that the crime of apartheid should have been included in the list of 
crimes against humanity was originally made by the representative of Mexico.
71
 The 
only recorded support for the Mexican proposal initially came from the representative 
of Ireland (on the grounds that apartheid was an example of a crime that could be 
committed outside the context of an armed conflict)
72
 but it prompted the Chairman to 
note that ‘[i]t had been suggested that the crime of apartheid should be added to the 
list [of crimes against humanity]'.
73
 At a subsequent meeting, several delegations 
expressed support for the express inclusion of apartheid in the list of war crimes.
74
 
With regard to both ‘enforced disappearances’ and ‘the crime of apartheid’ 
(acts not previously proscribed by major precedents), there was some initial 
reluctance to including them in the Rome Statute’s definition of crimes against 
                                                 
68
 C. Hall, ‘(h) “The crime of apartheid”’, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2nd edn., C.H. Beck/Hart/Nomos, 
2008), at 228 fn. 332. 
69
 See the Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1, 14 April 1998, at 26. 
70
 Ibid., at 20. 
71
 ‘Third Meeting of the Committee of the Whole’, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR3, 17 June 1998, UN 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
(Rome 15 June-17 July 1998) Official Records Volume II, Summary records of the plenary meetings 
and of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, at 152 [§ 125]. 
72
 Ibid., at 153 [§ 167]. 
73
 Ibid., at 154 [§ 178]. 
74
 See W. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford 
University Press, 2010), at 183 fn. 372.  
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humanity but pressure from Latin American countries in relation to enforced 
disappearances and from a group of primarily African states in the case of apartheid 
ensured that both were ultimately included in the definition of crimes against 
humanity in the Rome Statute.
75
 
 The formal proposal to add apartheid to the list of crimes against humanity 
was made by 10 countries;
76
 the earlier proposal to include apartheid within the list of 
war crimes made by a sub-group of six African states was not proceeded with.
77
 It has 
been asserted that the South African delegation was active in ensuring that the crime 
of apartheid was included in its own right and that the United States’ delegation 
worked to ensure a narrow definition ensued.
78
 
 
B. The Definition of the Crime of Apartheid in the Rome Statute 
Article 7(1)(j) of the Rome Statute states that ‘the crime of apartheid’ is a crime 
against humanity when committed ‘as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack’. Article 7(2)(h) 
of the Rome Statute stipulates that for the purpose of paragraph 1: 
 
‘The crime of apartheid’ means inhumane acts of a character similar to those 
referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an institutionalized 
regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over 
any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of 
maintaining that regime. 
 
 Given that Article 7(1)(h) criminalizes persecution against any identifiable 
group or collectivity on (inter alia) racial or ethnic grounds, the crime of apartheid in 
the Rome Statute would appear to be limited to a residual category of inhuman acts 
                                                 
75
 See further H. von Hebel and D. Robinson, ‘Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court’, in R. Lee 
(ed.), The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute – Issues, Negotiations, 
Results (Kluwer Law International, 1999) 79-126, at 102. 
76
 UN Doc. A./CONF.183/C.1/L.12, 22 June 1998, reproduced in UN Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Rome 15 June-17 July 
1998) Official Records Volume III, Reports and other documents, at 239. 
77
 Clark, supra note 29, at 619 fn. 135. 
78
 See T. McCormack, ‘Crimes Against Humanity’, in D. McGoldrick et al. (eds), The Permanent 
International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues (Hart, 2004) 179-202, at 198-9. 
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not falling within the ambit of the concept of persecution
79
 or ‘other inhuman acts of a 
similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to 
mental or physical health’80 but requiring, in addition, the context of ‘of an 
institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination’ and the specific 
intent to maintain that regime. This residual category would appear to be either (i) any 
inhuman acts that did not cause great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental 
or physical health or (ii) acts that did not constitute ‘the intentional and severe 
deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law’. As Dugard has noted 
in relation to the Apartheid Convention, proving the necessary specific intention will 
be difficult to establish in practice against all but the political leaders responsible for 
the design and implementation of the ideology of apartheid.
81
 
 
C. Conclusion 
The ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadić case stated that the legal weight to be 
attached to the provisions of the Rome Statute had been correctly set out by Trial 
Chamber II in Furundžija.82 Namely that, although still a non-binding treaty at that 
stage, the text ‘may be taken to express the legal position i.e. the opinio iuris of those 
States’ that attended the Rome Diplomatic Conference and adopted the Statute.83 
Significantly, this formulation leaves out the qualifying phrase ‘in many areas’. With 
regard to Article 7(1)(j) of the Rome Statute, the crime of apartheid, its absence from 
any universally accepted major precedent confirms that it can only be viewed as 
progressive development. 
Clark acknowledges that the addition of the crime of apartheid to the Rome 
Statute was more symbolic than anything else but observes that he took great joy in 
watching the representatives of those states that washed their hands of the Apartheid 
                                                 
79
 Art. 7(2)(g) ICCSt. defines persecution as ‘the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental 
rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity’. 
80
 Art. 7(1)(k) ICCSt. A marginal note to the Elements of Crime – Art. 7(1)(j) Crime against humanity 
of apartheid states: ‘It is understood that “character” refers to the nature and gravity of the act'. 
81
 Dugard, supra note 27, at 203. 
82
 Judgment, Furundžija (IT-95-17/1-T), Trial Chamber II, 10 December 1998, § 227 (‘In many areas 
the [Rome] Statute may be regarded as indicative of the legal views, i.e. opinio juris of a great number 
of States.’). 
83
 Judgment, Tadić (IT-94-1-A), Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, § 223. Judge Shahabuddeen 
indicated that he had reservations on the statement in the judgment of the Appeal Chamber on the 
relationship between the ICCSt. and the development of customary international law. See Separate 
Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, § 3. 
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Convention ‘sagely agreeing that the [Rome] Statute would be sadly incomplete 
unless something suitable including the word apartheid were added'.
84
 Cassese argues 
that the fact that Article 7(1)(j) of the Rome Statute grants the ICC jurisdiction over 
the crime and the fact that Article 7(2)(h) provides a definition of the crime of 
apartheid ‘might gradually facilitate the formation of a customary rule'.85 Cassese also 
asserts that this development could occur if a case concerning ‘inhuman acts’ 
committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic racial oppression 
was ever brought before the ICC
86
 but, given the limited nature of the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, this would only be a possibility where a state had accepted the existence 
of the crime of apartheid as a treaty obligation by virtue of their ratification of the 
Rome Statute. 
 
IV. The Principle of Legality and the Crime of Apartheid 
One of the fundamental principles of both domestic and international criminal law is 
the principle of legality.
87
 The core principle of legality embodies two guiding sub-
principles. First, no one should be punished unless it was sufficiently clear and certain 
what conduct was forbidden before the accused acted (the principle of certainty or 
nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege certa). Secondly, no one should be punished for 
any act that was not clearly and ascertainably punishable when the act was done (the 
principle of non retroactivity or nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege praevia).
88
 
Article 11(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states  
 
                                                 
84
Clark, supra note 29, at 619. 
85
 Cassese, supra note 26, at 13. See also ibid., at 126 (acknowledging that Art. 7 is broader than 
customary international law but may contribute to the formation of a customary rule on the matter). 
86
 Ibid. 
87
 See generally C. Kreß, ‘Nulla poena nullum crimen sine lege’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Volume VII, MA-OZ (Oxford University Press, 2012) 889-
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University Press, 2009); and M. Bassiouni, ‘Principles of Legality in International and Comparative 
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No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or 
international law, at the time when it was committed.
89
 
 
The wording of Article 11(2) implies that the failure to incorporate an international 
crime into domestic law does not breach the principle of legality
90
 but the common 
law conception of the rule of law goes further and requires the express incorporation 
of even the most heinous violations of international law into domestic law before 
jurisdiction over an international crime can be said to exist.
91
 
Gallant asserts that ‘[t]his stronger version of legality is not required by 
customary international human rights law'.
92
 Gallant also asserts that re-characterizing 
a crime from international law to domestic law does not raise jurisdictional issues 
because ‘[t]he forum state may characterize its criminal proceedings as an application 
of its own substantive criminal law on the basis of universal jurisdiction'.
93
 Gallant 
acknowledges that his analysis only applies to crimes under customary international 
law (because customary international law applies everywhere) and that his position 
disregards the possibility of persistent objection.
94
 With regard to many international 
crimes (particularly war crimes), the principle of foreseeability is satisfied by the fact 
that the conduct (e.g. murder (usually the intentional extra-judicial killing of non-
combatants)) is clearly criminal under every domestic legal system in the world.
95
 
 
                                                 
89
 This wording has been replicated in numerous human rights treaties (both regional and international) 
and now represents a customary norm. See International Law Association, Committee on the 
Enforcement of Human Rights Law, Final Report on the Status of the Universal Declaration of Human 
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93
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V. Conclusion 
In 2004, the South African Constitutional Court stated that, '[i] is also clear that the 
practice of apartheid constituted crimes against humanity and some of the practices of 
the apartheid government constituted war crimes'.
96
 The authorities given for this 
conclusion were the 1968 Convention, Article 1 of the Apartheid Convention, and 
John Dugard’s observation in a case note on the AZAPO case that the two conventions 
and the fact that apartheid had been labelled as a crime against humanity in numerous 
UNGA resolutions ‘have led to widespread acceptance that the practices of Apartheid 
constituted crimes against humanity'.
97
 For the reasons given above, neither the 1968 
Convention nor the Apartheid Convention however, support the existence of a 
customary international crime. Further, Dugard’s position is rather more nuanced than 
the South African Constitutional Court acknowledged: in fact, Dugard stated that, ‘the 
precise status of the crime of apartheid is today uncertain’ and that ‘it may be a crime 
against humanity under customary international law’.98 
 The particular significance of the Rome Statute is that, for the first time, 
apartheid has been criminalized in a manner that is consistent with penal legality and 
certainty. In R v. Finta, the Canadian Supreme Court noted that ‘[t]he strongest source 
in international law for crimes against humanity, however, are the common domestic 
prohibitions of civilized nations’.99 As noted in the introduction, the incorporation of 
new international crimes into the domestic criminal law of states is essential to ensure 
both normative alignment and source legitimacy for these transformative initiatives. 
Unfortunately, in the case of the crime of apartheid, domestic implementation has not 
been uniform. 
In 1993, for example, when Belgium acted to incorporate serious violations of 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols I and II of 1977 under 
the Act on the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, the 
legislation did not cover crimes later incorporated into the Rome Statute such as the 
crime of apartheid as a crime against humanity (although this was incorporated as a 
war crime). In 1999, when the Belgian Parliament incorporated the provisions relating 
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to crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute into Belgian law, the enforced 
disappearance of persons, the crime of apartheid and other inhumane acts of a similar 
character were omitted. With regard to enforced disappearances and other inhumane 
acts, Vandermeersch asserts that these omissions would appear to have been 
oversights but, with regard to the crime of apartheid, the Belgian Parliament 
considered the definition in the Rome Statute ‘to be framed in terms too broad to be 
compatible with the requirement of legal certainty’.100 These omissions were rectified 
in 2003 when Belgium corrected its legislation by inserting the omitted crimes into its 
domestic law.
101
 Likewise Germany has incorporated the crime of apartheid into its 
domestic law in a manner that deviates from the Rome Statute ‘in order to meet the 
requirements of legal certainty under the German Constitution'.
102
 
The 'copy-out' technique
103
 (i.e. cutting and pasting the relevant sections of the 
Rome Statute) adopted by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor (UNTAET)
104
 is indicative of how the process of incorporating apartheid into 
the list of customary international law crimes is likely to develop but regard should 
also be had to the view of the Secretary-General (in relation to the competence ratione 
materiae of the proposed ICTY) that  
 
the application of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege requires that the 
international tribunal should apply rules of international humanitarian law 
which are beyond any doubt part of customary law so that the problem of the 
adherence of some but not all States to specific conventions does not arise.
105
 
 
Given this advice and the fact that the crime of apartheid was not included in the 
Statute of the ICTY, the statement in the Tadić case that ‘[a]dditional codifications of 
international law have also confirmed the customary law status of the prohibition of 
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crimes against humanity, as well as two of its most egregious manifestations: 
genocide and apartheid’106 seems somewhat ill-considered vis-à-vis apartheid. 
Although both Additional Protocol I and the Rome Statute have been widely 
ratified, there are a number of states that remain non-parties to both treaties. With 
regard to the Rome Statute, only 120 countries voted in favour of adoption, seven 
(including the United States, China and Israel) voted against and another 21 states 
abstained. As Bethlehem has noted, ‘[i]f States have objections to particular treaty-
based rules, those objections will subsist as regards the formulation of the rules in a 
customary format'.
107
 
Two crucial further facts also mitigate against a conclusion that apartheid is a 
crime against humanity under customary international law. First, notwithstanding the 
number of ratifications of the Apartheid Convention, it is remarkable that the vast 
majority of the parties to the Apartheid Convention failed to incorporate the crime of 
apartheid into their domestic law prior to the drafting of the Rome Statute,
108
 and, 
secondly, the position taken by South Africa — still not a party to the Apartheid 
Convention — in the conjoined In Re South African Apartheid Litigation cases (i.e. its 
failure to assert that apartheid per se was a very serious crime under international 
law).
109
 
The new edition of Cassese’s International Criminal Law acknowledges that 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute is broader than customary international law (because ‘it 
broadens the classes of conduct amounting to crimes against humanity’) in relation to 
the crime of apartheid but states that ‘it could be argued that the [Rome] Statute has, 
however, contributed to recent formation of a customary rule on the matter’.110 
It is questionable whether the incorporation of the crime of apartheid into the 
domestic law of states that are parties to the Rome Statute can contribute to the 
formation of a customary rule because, as the ICJ observed in the North Sea 
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Continental Shelf Cases, no inference can legitimately be drawn as to the existence of 
a rule of customary law contained in a treaty provision from the behaviour of the 
parties to the treaty.
111
 Of course, for a treaty with such widespread ratification as the 
Rome Statute (currently 122 parties), it becomes increasingly difficult to demonstrate 
state practice by states who are not parties, the so-called Baxter Paradox.
112
 Meron 
has argued that Baxter overstated the nature and effect of the ICJ’s statement that the 
practice of the parties to a convention lacks evidentiary weight in the creation of 
customary law and quotes the statement of the ICJ that ‘very widespread and 
representative participation’ in a convention ‘might suffice of itself’ to create a 
general rule of international law.
113
 
The most promising development for those wishing to assert the customary 
status of the crime of apartheid is the use of the copy-out technique in defining crimes 
against humanity in the African Union (AU) Model National Law on Universal 
Jurisdiction over International Crimes recommended for adoption by African 
Ministers of Justice and Attorney Generals in their meeting held in Addis Ababa on 
14 and 15 May 2012.
114
 At its 19
th
 Summit held in Addis Ababa in July 2012, the AU 
Assembly passed a decision encouraging AU Member States ‘to fully take advantage 
of this Model National Law in order to expeditiously enact or strengthen their 
National Laws in this area’.115 It should be stressed that in order for the principle of 
legitimacy to be fully respected, it will be the adoption of this Model National Law 
into the domestic law of AU member states (and particularly those states who are not 
parties to the Rome Statute if the Baxter paradox is a reality) that will strengthen the 
argument for the crystallization of the crime of apartheid (as defined in the Rome 
Statute) as a customary crime against humanity under international law. 
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